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Introduction: Rethinking 
the Political Economy 
of Post-Socialism 
By the end of 1991, the West's significant other was replaced by fifteen 
independent countries undergoing experiments of remaking complex 
social structures, what one group of scholars called a "quadruple tran-
sition" (D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio 1999): transforming economies 
(marketization), polities (democratization), state structures, and political 
identities and communities (nations and ethnicities). This event, whose 
echoes reverberate, is among the most important events for the social 
sciences, as these experiences provide social laboratories to study the-
ories of economics and politics (unfortunately for those enduring the 
experiments). Yet social science failed to address adequately the mas-
sively complex process unfolding there. On the economic front, early 
predictions, hopes, and analyses growing out of the neoliberal model 
(Lipton et al 1990; Lipton, Sachs, and Summers 1990; Fisher and Gelb 
1991; Aslund 1995) could not adequately account for confusion, con-
flict, and multiple trajectories in their overly simplistic and normative 
accounts of economic and political life. Actors themselves, from politi-
cal elite and nomenklatura to steelworkers and students, understood little 
more than academics: while not wedded to problematic formal theo-
ries, their common sense told them some kinds of change were needed, 
such as releasing the polity and economy from the grip of the state 
and hegemonic Communist Party. On the political front, the consol-
idation of democracy has been far from uniform and smooth across 
post-socialist countries, and several have taken steps "backward" into 
various forms of authoritarianism, whether covert (Ukraine and Russia) 
or overt (Belarus). State structures remain sturdier in East Europe than 
in the former USSR, as corruption and state capacity to enforce policies 
have haunted the latter for twenty years or more. National and ethnic 
boundaries and identities remain explosive, leading to disintegration 
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(Yugoslavia) and internal conflict (Russia) as well as tensions that are 
less explosive but still troubling (e.g. Ukraine). 
While the label "post-socialist" is used less often in academic and 
public discourse, this does not mean we should discard the label of 
the meaning behind it. The socialist experience and the process and 
dynamics by which Soviet-style socialism fell-along with the countries, 
politics, economies, and societies involved-remain important issues. 
Dynamics of social, political, and economic change after 1991 deserve 
yet more study, but scholarship has continuously been dogged by obsta-
cles and problems: access to necessary data, language barriers, trying to 
make sense of a moving target (when scholarly production is a drawn-
out process), and the intersection of scholarly debates with political 
agendas. I would add another: meta-theoretical narratives themselves, 
with their categories and narratives of social normality, clouded schol-
arly judgment. Scholars were not sufficiently reflexive about their own 
categories of analysis. Consider the fate of the category "post-socialism" 
(not the phenomenon). Without the "post-socialist" category, there 
would not be "post-socialist" research. As of late, the vague label "emerg-
ing markets" seems a favored term that lumps post-socialist countries 
with others of different historical backgrounds and trajectories, driving 
potential attention away from the socialist experiment and experi-
ence. Yet the assignment of this category across the board assumes an 
ambiguous "one-size-fits-all" "market" is "emerging" inexorably in these 
post-socialist countries. This fits the universalizing logic of economic 
theory: all contexts of time and space lose their specific meanings and 
significance.1 All of social time and space become one generic whole, less 
from any particular insights than from the attempt to fit human empir-
ical reality into a theory and method that cannot account for meaning, 
power, and other social factors that are contextually dependent. This 
hides issues of complex mechanisms of social, political, and economic 
change, and denies fundamental variation in processes and trajectories. 
(Or if there is variation, it must be marginal-else we would not have 
"emerging" and "markets" together.) This clumps Russia (and Ukraine, 
Belarus, etc.) with other "emerging markets"-yet this makes sense only 
if we presume history, culture, and "path dependence" do not matter.2 
While the majority of economists and political scientists in the rational 
choice tradition might assume thus, empirical studies on many fronts 
show that path dependency remains powerful and that history matters 
through preexisting practices, stocks of knowledge, and assumptions of 
social normality and legitimate social organization. To make sense of 
how the Soviet Union as a complex of ideology, institutions, practices, 
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organizations, and structures shifted and was remade, we have to take 
seriously the past as well as contingent processes of social construction. 
This means moving beyond the instrumental rationality that domi-
nates much of the social sciences, especially economics but also political 
science and some sociology. Instrumental rationality denotes a way of 
thinking primarily in terms of means to reach goals most effectively 
and efficiently; goals are generally taken as given. Actors calculate costs 
and benefits of action for achieving those ends, and they view their 
social world in terms of tools to use toward those ends. Tools, costs 
and benefits, and ends are generally materialist: money, time, or other 
"real" objects that can be measured, or whose worth (utility) can be mea-
sured. In the rational actor model that dominates economic theory and 
increasingly political science, the typical individual is not far from being 
a lawyer or accountant (only without special training).3 Certainly, there 
are moments when we calculate costs and benefits of action, pursue 
materialist goals, and think of rules, other people, and the like as instru-
mental tools. My goal is not to deny instrumental rationality exists. 
Yet to ground analyses entirely or primarily in instrumental rationality 
severely oversimplifies social life. Norms, meanings, assumptions of how 
the social world operates normally, 4 and the like-what social scientists 
lump under "culture"-are important in everyday social, political, and 
economic life. We might calculate-although the degree to which we 
do so clearly and consciously, even "rationally," remains debatable-but 
calculations are embedded in our assumptions and understandings of 
what we should and can calculate, how we measure and embody value, 
and categories by which we code other actors and actions around us. 
Actors don't merely respond unconsciously to "incentives"; they turn 
to "tool kits" of norms, strategies, and symbols (Swidler 1986) to make 
sense of and to respond to contexts. 
To use the language of economic sociology, not enough scholar-
ship of the post-socialist experience has placed sufficient emphasis on 
embeddedness (Granovetter 1985). Those studies that have attempted to 
do so, for example invoking networks or aspects of culture (Humphrey 
2002; McDermott 2002), provide good first steps forward, except that 
embeddedness in too many cases is not sufficiently systematic or is con-
ceived of in only one dimension, such as networks, political alliances, 
or legal frameworks. It is also as if networks or culture is added on top of 
the analysis, rather than providing core ideas guiding the analysis. This 
book makes embeddedness central and seeks to explore the social roots 
and nature of the politics of post-Soviet, post-socialist change-to open 
up those tool kits of norms and responses. Most work by economists 
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and political scientists has provided important insights and grist for 
debate (albeit not always the best policies). However, much of that 
discourse suffers from flaws that narrow their analytic vision and con-
tribute to errors of omission and commission. In particular, these works 
tend to assume instrumental rationality as the sole or predominant logic 
of human decision-making and action; as a result, these myriad works 
tend to focus primarily on technical aspects of change, that is specific 
legislation or actors' narrow material interests. Again, I do not claim 
material interests, instrumental rationality, and technical details of poli-
cies are unimportant-but they are only part of the picture. To fixate on 
them without considering broader "culture" and "authority" in which 
social action is embedded risks oversimplifying or erroneously identi-
fying roots of action and processes of change. Thus, a key goal is to 
use an overview of Russia's post-Soviet history, especially the turbulent 
1990s, to examine just how culture and authority mattered in contex-
tualizing instrumental rationality and the operation and outcomes of 
reforms. In particular, I examine the confrontation between two logics 
of social-economic practice, organization, and legitimacy: market and 
moral economies. 
Post-Soviet scholarship, theory, and social-economic 
normality 
When the iron curtain fell in 1989 and the USSR vanished in 1991, 
scholarship was already studying political transformations in Latin 
America and East Asia, especially the turn from state-led economies 
to freer markets and military or single-party dictatorships to more 
open polities. Trajectories and processes of economic and political 
change depended on relations to the global economy, policy timing and 
sequencing, and relations between states and domestic elites (Gereffi 
and Wyman 1990; Haggard 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Evans 
1995). It would seem that scholars should have been ready to make sense 
of post-socialism. At first glance, Latin American and socialist economies 
seemed similar: strong state roles, including property ownership and 
price controls; protectionist insulation from the global economy; and 
politicization of the economy (Przeworski 1991; Clague 1992). However, 
there were important differences between the Soviet economic system 
and Latin American Import Substitution Industrialization that would 
lead to differences not only in initial conditions but also in the learning 
and reform processes (Beltran and Hass 2010). Twenty years later it is 
apparent how the depth of difficulties in post-socialist reforms was not 
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so well appreciated or expected in the early 1990s. Latin America had 
private property, capitalist elites, and operational relations of exchange 
and investment with foreign corporations and institutional investors. 
Latin American states intervened in the economy more through price 
and wage controls and ownership or subsidization of important, large 
firms (e.g. oil, telecommunications, finance). In the Soviet economy, 
the economy was embedded in the state; the state was the economy. 
Price and employment stability were closely linked to ideological legit-
imation of regime and system. Civil society existed only in shadows of 
the Party-state. Not ready to burst out with liberalization, civil society 
instead had to create itself once the Soviet Union and its satellite states 
were sufficiently weak. Often overlooked, Latin American and East Asian 
transitions did not entail reconfiguration of nation-states. The collapse 
of the USSR meant rebuilding not only economic and political institu-
tions but also identities and confronting legacies of practices that were 
consciously anti-capitalist and verged on the theocratic. 
Post-Soviet change entailed confronting these legacies-a harbinger 
of conflict. Reality did not let us down. Yet limitations of popular 
paradigms in economics and political science restricted capacity to fore-
see problems and trajectories that did not conform to hopes of the 
early 1990s: conflict over privatization was no surprise, but the confu-
sion inherent in post-socialist change was underestimated, the degree of 
economic conflict was not expected, and emergence of Putin's dirigisme 
was not a great surprise but required more thorough understanding. 
Inflation, macroeconomic instability, turf wars between the center and 
regions or competing elites-these are the stuff of neoclassical eco-
nomics and political science, and we have learned from studies in these 
traditions. But post-Soviet reality was much richer. Even if we focus 
on one country, as I do here (Russia), the reality includes issues of 
power in all its complexity, culture in all its nuances, and contention 
driven not only by material interests but also by moral economies and 
notions of normal and legitimate politics and economics. When addi-
tional countries are added into the comparative mix, the story becomes 
even richer. 
In the 1980s, Stephen Cohen (1985) launched an important critique 
of Soviet studies and the consensus of the "totalitarian school" that 
could not contemplate reform emerging within the system. Nearly fif-
teen years later, Cohen (1999) launched an attack on "transitology. 11 
If many of his remarks were unfair to the full discourse (e.g. Cohen 
2009), he is correct that we need to rethink that discourse and its 
object. I suggest broad waves of scholarship on post-socialist change 
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to help us identify what might need more investigation. While waves 
are never perfectly demarcated, this should serve as a basic starting 
point. The first wave of post-socialist studies, sometimes called "tran-
sitology," ended in the later 1990s, when it was clear that post-Soviet 
reforms were more painful and complicated than originally envisioned 
(cf. Amsden, Kochanowicz, and Taylor 1994). It was characterized by 
optimism for a natural progression to a single market model (regres-
sion to a norm), neoclassical assumptions of economics, and a fixation 
on prices, exchange, property, and macroeconomic factors (e.g. money 
supply). 
That first wave of post-socialist scholarship was in part an extrap-
olation of experiences and "received wisdom" from Latin American 
reforms. While the basic assumptions in First Wave's literature were 
straightforward and shared by most involved-reliance on the ratio-
nal actor, simplistic notions about institutions and institutional change, 
and simplistic and abstract constructs of an ideal-typical "market"-the 
conclusions drawn from these assumptions grouped First Wave schol-
ars into two camps: shock therapists and gradualists. The discourse was 
dominated by economists, as in such journals as The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (e.g. Ericson 1991; Fisher and Gelb 1991; McKinnon 1991; 
Murrell 1991; Svejnar 1991). The First Wave was marked by seminal 
statements on the problem of market-building by Lipton et al (1990) 
and Lipton, Sachs, and Summers (1990). The major problem of the 
Soviet-style economy was price deformation from strong state control 
of production and exchange and lack of private property. Given how 
neoclassical economic theory relies heavily on prices and equilibrium 
to make the model work-prices make the rational actor at the heart 
of the model work, equilibrium makes markets "clear" and allows the 
assumptions of market efficiency to be fulfilled-this is unsurprising. 
Liberalization and privatization were key remedies, although as Clague 
(1992) noted, market-building also required institutional change (e.g. 
bankruptcy law, defense of property rights, governance law). The shock 
therapy school claimed rapid liberalization and privatization were nec-
essary to end the goods famine and create viable market institutions and 
infrastructure, while tight budgets and foreign investment would repair 
macroeconomic deformations. Initial shock would cause pain, but ratio-
nal actors maximizing profit in a liberalized environment would quickly 
accommodate. Gradualists disagreed, making more of the importance 
of learning and making new institutions operative: it was not enough 
merely to legislate change, for business actors had to learn and the 
state had to enforce the post-socialist market. Scholars in this camp 
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(cf. Murrell 1991, 1993) argued that market-building would take longer; 
a state sector should be retained while (small) private business became 
established and necessary institutions (bankruptcy, property law, courts) 
were created, activated, and came over growing pains. After the intro-
duction of limited reforms, actors would be given time to adjust to new 
institutions and their logic (Murrell 1991). The drawbacks were obvious 
to each side. Shock therapy risked political backlash and might not cor-
respond to social reality (especially the rational actor and equilibrium 
assumptions); gradualism risked crashing on the rocks of corruption and 
reform backsliding. Shock therapists pointed first to Latin America and 
then to Poland as successes (albeit this claim to victory is not without 
controversy); gradualists pointed out China (Murrell 1993). 
In spite of the debate, both sides had overlapping assumptions. 
The first was a single ideal-type "market" toward which Russia and 
other post-socialist economies should move. While the contours of this 
"market" were never concrete-had they been, variation in capitalist 
economies could have been built into models to aid policy-making-
they were also specific in an abstract manner.5 Markets had liberalized 
exchange, private property defended by the state, infrastructure for 
information flow (and hence for efficient investment of resources), insti-
tutions of entrance (capital markets) and exit (bankruptcy), and in 
more sophisticated models governance structures to minimize transac-
tion and agency costs (cf. Clague 1992). This ideal type, no doubt a 
holdover from the Cold War era of socialism versus capitalism (rather 
than capitalisms), could not allow for adequate inclusion of differ-
ent forms, such as state-centered oligopolies (France or South Korea), 
state/firm cooperative models CTapan), state-sheltered small-firm mod-
els (Taiwan), or bank-centered economies (Germany), in addition to 
the American model. Given the level of abstraction from reality, the 
oversimplified understanding of institutions, and the ahistorical bent of 
neoclassical thinking, the focus on a single ideal-typical market is not 
surprising, even if this was in the end highly problematic for the First 
Wave. Had First Wave scholars incorporated variation, policy choices 
would have been more open and would have paid attention to his-
torical, power, and cultural factors. The second assumption of both 
camps was that institutions are laws and regulations that shape costs 
and benefits; the actor (entrepreneur or firm) was assumed to be a 
profit-maximizing rational actor. This is the basic blueprint for New 
Institutional Economics (cf. Williamson 1985; North 1990). Certainly 
rules matter, and some First Wave scholars are to be commended for 
jumping over pure neoclassical theory to take institutions into closer 
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account. Yet even so, post-socialist economic reality remained oversim-
plified, no doubt because even New Institutional Economics remains 
oversimplified (cf. North 1990). 
By 1996 it was clear that early perspectives could not adequately 
answer more sophisticated questions; as a special set of articles in one 
issue of American Sociological Review noted (volume 101, issue 1, 1996), 
much was misunderstood in East Europe. Arguably the toughest nut 
to crack, Russia, was even more badly understood, and extrapolating 
from Poland or Hungary to Russia was a dangerous leap of theoret-
ical faith. By the August 1998 financial collapse, the First Wave of 
post-socialist scholarship was in tatters, leaving some of its champi-
ons (e.g. Anders Aslund) to retreat into apologetics. Michael Burawoy's 
(1997) critique of neoclassical approaches hammered home that Russian 
post-socialist economic change did not unfold as envisioned by shock 
therapists or even gradualists: the landscape was littered with cheap 
imports, falling wages, oligarch on the loose, and economic depen-
dency. Further, in comparative context, variation of outcomes could 
not be captured adequately with economists' tools. Even early soci-
ological analyses (Burawoy and Hendley 1992; Burawoy and Krotov 
1992) suggested that hopes for Russia were at best mixed; some firms 
could adapt to rapid changes, while others had a difficult time of it. 
What was clear was that muddling through versus adaptability was not 
directly correlated with "efficiency," except tautologically. Later studies 
(Clarke et al 1994; Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse 1997; Hass 1999) sug-
gested that variation could be accounted for only by introducing power, 
culture, and a deeper understanding of institutions. Russian data (Boeva 
and Dolgopiatova 1993; Dolgopiatova 1994; Dolgopiatova and Evseeva 
1994; Ryvkina 1998) suggested the transition was anything but-straight-
forward. Neither shock therapists' nor gradualists' questions, answers, 
and models could make sense of where Russia was headed and why. 
While there was no single work heralding the Second Wave, several 
writings and events make up the initial swell. Arguably, among the 
most important was Thomas Graham's (1995) article in Nezavisimaia 
gazeta analyzing political "clans." This wave of scholarship, driven by 
political science and political economy, appreciated elite intrigue and 
the state. If some first wave economic studies proposed reform policies, 
second wave literature asked where real policies came from and why 
implementation had not created a vibrant market. In particular, the 
protracted pain of post-socialist reform and the emergence of oligarchs 
bred much second wave scholarship; the repercussions of the August 
1998 ruble meltdown and the rise of Vladimir Putin consecrated the 
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new wave of scholarship, in which politics reigned supreme. Politi-
cal stability and authority became central issues in the second wave, 
for example weak monitoring and "bank runs" on state resources and 
authority (Solnick 1998), problematic financial institutions and policy 
tools Oohnson 2000), regional variation stemming from elite coalitions 
(Stoner-Weiss 1997), informal privatization of security and violence cre-
ating multiple sites of power and thus instability (Volkov 2002), and 
competition between the regions and the center over political and 
financial sovereignty (Woodruff 1999a), among other issues. The Sec-
ond Wave of post-socialist studies, especially vis-a-vis Russia, was more 
heterogeneous than First Wave literature, which was dominated by 
economists and their generally shared paradigm. However, one can find 
common threads in the second wave. Because political scientists had 
entered the fray, politics and the state had become the main actors to 
the various stories. Assumptions of efficiency gave way to assumptions 
of competition over power and gain; economies were no longer assumed 
to move to equilibrium and a state of efficiency. Instead, the prevailing 
theme was that political competition would breed contention and con-
flict. Most First Wave scholars assumed state leaders were willing and 
able to impose some kinds of reforms; Second Wave scholars problema-
tized reform by making politics endogenous. Russia's oligarchs are not 
so odd in Second Wave scholarship; in fact, we should have seen them 
coming: wasn't this what had happened in Britain (wealthy aristocrats 
turning to textiles and trade) and the United States (industrial robber 
barons)? 
Yet if the Second Wave reminded us of the importance of politics, 
both "politics" and "economics" remained trapped in assumptions or 
oversimplifications, often related a reliance on instrumental rationality 
and rational choice to make theoretical arguments work. "Politics" was 
primarily the intrigues and actions of elites, whether in the Kremlin or 
regional satraps. Economic structures emerged from elite competition. 
There is much to recommend such an approach, and my goal is not 
to dismiss political economy out of hand: I learned much from it, as 
have many students of social change. Still, the empirical and theoretical 
pictures left out much reality. Elites are embedded in webs of meaning, 
and their authority is never as automatic as political economy assumes. 
In fact, one dilemma of post-socialist elites was creating and maintain-
ing authority over subordinates. One powerful contradiction in much 
political economy is that analyses assume states and elites are so central 
because their word literally is law enforced by officials and subordinates. 
The scholarly image of post-Soviet Russia was a war of sorts between 
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generals and colonels (national and regional elites), with everyone else 
foot soldiers ready to move at their commanders' orders. Yet in the same 
breath, scholars of political economy easily admit the problem of cor-
ruption in post-socialist countries. So, institutions assumed to operate 
through the actions of subordinate officials, who are often enough cor-
rupt, meaning that laws, policies, and institutions do not operate as they 
should. The result is a theoretical dilemma. 
Cultural contradictions of post-socialism 
In fact, these lacunae are one launching point for this book: rather 
than assume institutions and organizations are operative, I claim we 
need to examine just how states, economies, authority, and the like 
are reproduced or change in everyday practices of "little people." These 
practices are more than cold, instrumental calculations that are the basis 
of human behavior in economic theory. People have material interests, 
but they also have identities and norms: people are usually not one-
dimensional cold, calculating actors. In addition, market-building also 
requires learning a new economic logic and everyday routines as well as 
skills (Nelson and Winter 1982), and these cannot be imposed rapidly 
by governmental or managerial commands from on high. These dimen-
sions have not gone entirely ignored, and I suggest their importance, 
overlooked for most of the 1990s, has helped generate what might be 
the beginnings of a third wave, although whether it will swell to a 
real "wave" remains to be seen. Caroline Humphrey (2002) was one 
such early scholar: her anthropology of post-socialism dug into rituals, 
practices, and meanings underlying "corruption," mafiia and organized 
crime, consumption, identity, and the real implementation of priva-
tization on the ground. Russian scholars (Boeva, Dolgopiatova, and 
Shironin 1992; Ryvkina 1998) noted the importance of culture, power, 
and institutions to the Russian case. Herrera (2004) used Bourdieu's con-
cepts of field and habitus to make better sense of regional variation 
in economic change, asking just how regional elites and actors took 
different paths to change. 
These point to "cultural contradictions" in economic change in 
Russian post-socialism, which was not only a period of the collapse and 
reconstruction of the economic, political, and legal systems, but also the 
very meanings making up those systems. While institutional and struc-
tural contradictions have been the usual focus on a legion of studies 
in economics and political science, the cultural dimension-symbols, 
meanings, practices-unfortunately has been badly analyzed, badly 
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conceptualized, or even ignored altogether. For example, Shiller, Boycko, 
and Korobov (1992) use a cultural model that is a straw man; Soviets, 
they claim, wanted enrichment just like Westerners, which they claim 
disproves any unique Soviet "culture." However, this use of values-and 
an egregiously oversimplistic use and coding of "values"-went beyond 
the "straw man" label, as it ignored thirty years of advances in concep-
tualizing and operationalizing culture. (In average sociology, anthropol-
ogy, and history, culture means more than simplistic opinion measured 
through unsophisticated closed-ended surveys; even political scientists 
are moving beyond this outdated conceptualization.) In another exam-
ple, Solnick (1998) pitted institutional economics against Brzezinski's 
(1989) theory of the exhaustion of Soviet ideology to explain the col-
lapse of the USSR. Again, we have a straw man: Brzezinski's "ideology" 
is superficial values and norms of the kind easily measurable in opin-
ion surveys but that ultimately says little of importance when analyzing 
practice and change. An overreliance on instrumental rationality blinds 
us to narratives that actors tell and use to map out strategies and jus-
tifications, to themselves as well as constituents and competitors-yet 
we ignore these even though they surround us. We literally swim in 
a sea of discourse and frames of interpretation; economic theory and 
economists are no different. Their frame and narrative is a "science" 
that claims "objectivity" in unlocking the Truth of human social behav-
ior. Only by understanding power, culture, and the power-culture link 
do mysteries of the transition (e.g. different rates, trajectories, and suc-
cess of change within the Russian economy) start to make sense (cf. Hass 
1999, 2005). 
Yet ironically, culture, power, and institutions were never out of view.6 
James Millar (1995) understood their centrality to empirical reality in 
his criticisms of neoliberal analyses. Hendley's (1999) empirical account 
of inter-enterprise payment structures oozes culture and power, even if 
her theory does not. The problem is theoretical. The logic of New Insti-
tutional Economics, whereby action is a result of the costs and benefit of 
action as set by laws, still holds sway, but doubters have been emerging, 
especially from the direction of economic sociology. Mercifully, there 
are some quality analyses that apply culture in a sophisticated fashion to 
make sense of the confusion and contention that marked post-socialist 
transformations (e.g. Humphrey 2002; Kennedy 2002), and this work 
builds upon those. This book also draws on insights from the study of 
culture and structured meanings in international relations and the out-
break of war (Hopf 2002; Smith 2005), public policy (Dobbin 1994), and 
money (Zelizer 1997), among other subjects of political and economic 
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sociology. Smith's (2005) study of war is particularly informative. The 
decision to go to war is often understood in terms of instrumental 
calculations of gain and loss; this is the central point of realism and 
neorealism, and it is also the foundation of institutional approaches to 
war (much as rational choice underpins New Institutional Economics). 
Yet as Smith shows, culture helps predict whether states go to war and 
their degree of participation. The key is in a combination of categories 
and narratives. Categories of sacred and profane-objects and entities 
given meaning and placed into one of the two dichotomies-provide 
structure to the social universe. An object is some degree of normal or 
abnormal; otherwise, it is an object of ambivalence, off of the discursive 
map. These categories are then ordered into logics or narratives of how 
they interact and to what their interactions lead. 
This reveals a problem of the majority of work on post-socialism-
ironically, their own "cultural" problem. First Wave scholarship took 
the market for granted in Western terms, in the process assuming a 
single form of "market" economy and translating it into optimistic 
but simplistic policy. Economists in particular, but enough political 
scientists as well, took their own categories and narratives of "objec-
tive prices,'' "markets,'' "efficiency,'' "private property" and the like as 
natural for human nature and human social evolution (e.g. private prop-
erty corresponding to a natural desire of territoriality and ownership, 
utility maximization as natural). 7 Russians could be us if their elites 
enforced proper policies and everyone obeyed. This made politics of 
developing and implementing policy, including the inevitable pain of 
adjustment, exogenous-an egregious sin, especially as legitimation of 
policies and rationalization of pain were crucial to the narrative but 
unspoken. For shock therapists, there would be inevitable early pain 
of inflation and unemployment to make up for decades of structural 
"deformations" (a normative label already).8 Surviving early distribu-
tional conflicts would be rough waters, but eventually-in theory-the 
economy would improve as resources found their proper use and foreign 
investment flowed in. As Kennedy (2002) noted, shock therapy was part 
of a Western narrative of the triumph of liberalism. The market economy 
was the state of nature and progressive; anything else was unnatural and 
regressive. Because instrumental rationality was central to shock thera-
pists' paradigms and even identities as economists, it is unsurprising 
they could not escape their own narratives to see the importance of 
culture. What is somewhat surprising was how some more noted schol-
ars, such as Aslund, Schleifer, and Sachs, continue to beat the neoliberal 
drum (I return to this later); what we label "cognitive dissonance" is 
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really the difficulty or inability to escape one's categories and narratives 
in the face of stronger empirical evidence and counter-arguments. 
In the Second Wave, scholars began to take post-socialist economies 
on their own terms: as historically and culturally bounded set of prac-
tices, structures, and identities, with the process of making these the 
focus of study. If the First Wave's mistake was it's a central ques-
tion of "How will Russia build the market," the Second Wave asked, 
"Whose economy is emerging?" and "Who gains?" Yet even then, Sec-
ond Wave studies undertheorized power, culture, practice, and process. 
While political economy made its reappearance as scholars looked at 
elite machinations, unexpected outcomes of reforms, and struggles over 
power, instrumental rationality and a one-dimensional view of power 
once again predominated. Consider seemingly instrumentally rational 
phenomena. The return of the shadow economy, tactics of getting into 
quick trade and getting out for quick money, hiding from the tax 
police-these were "rational" responses to state predation and problem-
atic laws. Russian entrepreneurs did not work long hours to give more 
than 100 percent of profit to the state; most would pay all their taxes 
and act legally were that not a threat to solvency. First Wave and Sec-
ond Wave work did rightly point out that Russians are rational, and that 
the design of policies should keep this in mind. However, this was only 
one dimension of the shadow economy. As Humphrey (2002) pointed 
out, shadow economies, like "corruption" and privatization, are prac-
tices with multiple dimensions of meaning. The shadow economy was 
not simply an instrumentally opportunistic response to tax laws and 
state corruption; it was also a game of power and meaning, for example 
in which "bribes" were also "fees" entrepreneurs were prepared to pay 
to navigate the overly complex system of rules and red tape-in the pro-
cess contributing to the reproduction of "corruption." That corruption 
has become worse under Putin is partly a result of the Kremlin elite's 
own practices of taking private property selectively (i.e. taking Boris 
Berezovskii's and Mikhail Khodorkovskii's empires while others such as 
Roman Abramovich flouted wealth they gained in histories that remain 
secret): such practices from above legitimated local authorities, use of 
state authority for personal gain. 
One problem is that much scholarship on economies and economic 
change overlooks that which post-socialism clearly revealed, espe-
cially in Russia: "economies"-Soviet and reform socialism, American 
and French capitalism-are manifestations of power-culture and prac-
tice reified via narratives into socially ontological, autonomous 
essences. Analyses of "economies," especially by economists, assume 
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particular categories as objective, ontologically real, and universal (e.g. 
"prices" and "costs"), order those categories into normal/abnormal 
or sacred/profane, and then organize those binary sets into narra-
tives of seemingly evolutionary, natural social normality. Yet we need 
to question what "economies" to make sense of "economic change," 
"post-socialism," and so on. Post-socialist change is akin to processes 
Timothy Mitchell (2002) noted for Egypt, William Roy for America, 
and William Reddy and Karl Polanyi for French and British capital-
ism. A "market economy" is a set of meanings and narratives (Foucault 
1970; Mccloskey 2003). As Mitchell notes, "economy" once meant 
many connected practices; later, autonomous practices with their own 
laws that, in some discourses, are the core of human nature. Post-
World War II translations of Simmel added the definite article "the" 
to "economy," so that Simmel wrote of "the economy" rather than 
"economy"; or inserted "system" into Weber's definition of "economy" 
(Mitchell 2002: 80-81, 323n9). Today, bankers, accountants, journal-
ists, and state officials make up a "community of discourse" (Wuthnow 
1989) using market language, even if many do not know the math or 
speak different dialects. This discourse is not only categories; it is a 
meta-narrative of normality that reifies "economy" as a distinct social 
sphere.9 
Culture and narratives are never far from power. Categories and lan-
guage games are buttressed by the economics profession and institutions 
(the IMF, WTO, central bankers, multinational CEOs) with material and 
symbolic resources to force acceptance of this narrative and assump-
tions of "economy" that these keepers of truth understand (Centeno and 
Silva 1998). This power dynamic is hidden by hegemonic discourse of 
mainstream economics. Analyses end up caught in the meta-narrative, 
losing reflexivity and trapping analysts and readers inside categories 
that should be subject to study lest power-culture become invisible. 
In one pristine example, economist Andrei Shleifer, a student of Russia 
who advised its leaders, and co-author Donald Treisman (Shleifer and 
Treisman 2005; see also Shleifer 2005) dubbed Russia "normal," as its 
current problems (e.g. corruption) are "normal" for a country in Russia's 
position on the road to market utopia. Yet Shleifer is really providing less 
analysis than more grist for the reigning meta-narrative, where rational 
actors, markets, and material incentives play leading roles, and linear 
historical "progress" is assumed.10 Shock therapy, while imperfect, set 
Russia on the straight and narrow; oil wealth sped it further. Rather than 
study post-socialism as change on its own terms, Shleifer and Treisman 
shove it into a grand narrative that reifies "markets" and "economies" 
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and blinds us to questions of power and meaning-the heart and soul of 
economies, polities, societies, and change, as scholars in the nineteenth 
century saw with more sober clarity. 11 
As a rule, in too much First and Second Wave work power and author-
ity tend to be instrumental outcomes of laws, institutions, and elite 
games-which raises the tautology of assuming institutions to be oper-
ative in the first place. Culture has been ignored theoretically, although 
in informal discussions economists, political scientists, historians, and 
sociologists (Russian and non-Russian) readily admit the issue of Russian 
culture's impact on post-socialism. "These people just don't get it"-the 
cry of exasperation I heard so often from American and some Russian 
academics over twenty years of studying Russia-means culture lurks 
in informal analyses (and also in the worldviews of those making such 
comments, for what were Russians supposed to "get" anyway!). But 
this raises the question of just what "culture" is. Certainly, I am not 
accusing political scientists of ignoring ideology and "values" per se: 
public opinion polls, elite and party ideologies, and the like are grist 
for political science research. However, there is an interesting theoreti-
cal disconnect, especially in Public Choice theory and positive political 
economy (and increasingly in institutionalist political science): How do 
"ideology" and material interests or utility interact? Is ideology merely 
part of preferences or a framing of preferences?12 To reduce ideology or 
ethics to a preference is to push the issue off to the side and define it 
away-but this does not remove the impact of culture as a social pro-
cess and product. Culture is dynamic and historically contextualized 
and does not allow easy quantification and statistical modeling. I do 
not propose a model for quantification (but see Franzosi 2004); I do 
propose a structured approach to culture in post-socialism. Following 
Wuthnow (1987), Kennedy (2002), and Smith (2005), I view culture as 
the symbolic-expressive dimension of human action, which involves 
meaning through articulation (discourse), use of symbols, and mate-
rial practices related to a particular context (i.e. not just any generic 
material practice). One approach is culture as tacit knowledge and logics 
underlying practices (cf. Hass 2005). 
A complementary approach is to examine categories of meaning 
through which people order the world and the logics and narratives 
they construct to link those categories to create a blueprint for social 
order and structure.13 First, categories. Durkheim (1965 [1915]), Douglas 
(1966), Bourdieu (1990), Foucault (1977), and others demonstrated how 
people make sense of the vast physical and social environment by cre-
ating categories and placing objects or other entities into them ("boy," 
16 Rethinking the Post-Soviet Experience 
"girl," "community," etc.). Many categories (not all) are ordered into 
dichotomies of sacred and profane or normal and abnormal. This pro-
vides a second degree of order, along a continuum of positive-negative. 
(Status hierarchies are a variant of this, with low status equivalent to 
profane.) If categories order the social world in physical, social, or vir-
tual space, logics and narratives order the social world in time (Hass 
2011: chapter 1). A "logic" is a linking of categories and practices pre-
sumed to have affinity. Logics structure categories and practices into 
processes; these are linked to contexts, although they might be trans-
posable. A "narrative" is an ordering of categories and practices with 
teleological foundation (ultimate outcome): particular sequences of par-
ticular categories and practices lead to something. A logic of capitalism 
would be connected practices in a context; a narrative of capitalism 
would involve teleology of capitalist practices leading to something, for 
example exploitation and enrichment.14 
One important aspect of this approach is that narratives are not rele-
gated to far;:ades or mere accounts of material, institutional processes: 
narratives act as independent variables as well as outcomes. Narra-
tives result from actors combining and creating categories and their 
arrangements; they reduce uncertainty and create a template that at 
least proposes the possibility of agency. In a powerful insight, Nietzsche 
(2000: 46) wrote, "In this sense the Dionysian man is similar to Ham-
let: both have at one time cast a true glance into the essence of things, 
they have acquired knowledge, and action is repugnant to them; for their 
action can change nothing in the eternal essence of things, they feel that 
it is laughable or shameful that they are expected to repair a world which 
is out of joint. Knowledge kills action, to action belongs the veil of 
illusion ... " True knowledge of the complex reality of economies, or of 
anything social, would paralyze actors: narratives and cultural schemas 
let people believe that they can attempt action or even succeed.15 Such 
narratives and cultural frameworks not only provide illusions necessary 
for action; they can then act back on actors as templates for legiti-
macy and knowledge. The illusion becomes taken for granted as the 
true nature of reality. Regimes, elites, or other actors who champion 
and impose narratives risk losing legitimacy if they suddenly turn from 
them, unless they successfully pull off a "road to Damascus" moment of 
contrition-and even this is a risk to competency, as admitting mistakes 
often can be, and to trust, as others might suspect dishonesty. Narra-
tives can also be templates of knowledge, acting as the equivalent of 
ritualized, simplified theory or common sense. As Dobbin (1994) noted, 
different countries have different narratives about policies that guard 
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sacred sovereignty and produce economic growth, and standing against 
such narratives can encourage resistance. 16 Let me provide a brief illus-
tration to make my point concrete and to draw attention to cultural 
contradictions of the post-Soviet experience. Russian business discourse 
paired central categories of economic activity into profane Soviet ver-
sus sacred post-Soviet (market) groupings. Three such categories I list in 
Table I.1 below. 
Table I.l Soviet and post-Soviet business meanings 
Soviet-era term 
(profane) 
Upravlenie/direktor 
Predpriiatie 
Obedinenie 
Post-Soviet term (sacred) 
"Afenedzhment/menedzher 
Firma 
Kholding/korporatsiia 
(General meaning) 
(Economic leadership/leader) 
(Business organization) 
(Enterprise conglomerate) 
The reader can guess the etymology of the second column, business 
terms used since 1991. More than buzz words, these were central to new 
constructions of normal practice and the intended trajectory of change. 
Upravlenie meant bureaucratic administration of enterprises; the goal 
was to fulfill state orders to use labor and resources to make commodi-
ties, provide jobs, and so on. The goal was political-social. In contrast, 
menedzhment is a scientific approach for using labor and resources to 
make profit, oriented to the market rather than bureaucratic rules. These 
two words are not interchangeable, even if both are ostensibly a small 
group commanding a larger group. Power disappears in the new nor-
mality: direktor uses authority, but menedzher negotiates by rationally 
aligning incentives.17 Further, predpriiatie (enterprise) and obedinenie 
(production association), Soviet-era categories of bureaucratic organi-
zation, gave way to the profit-oriented firma, kholding, and korporatsiia 
(firm, holding company, corporation). These shifts in meanings were 
significant, hand-in-hand with contentious enterprise privatization and 
organizational restructuring. The Soviet obedinenie, concerned with ful-
filling Plan targets and providing welfare to workers while inculcating 
collective Soviet identities and practices, was to become a kholding ori-
ented to efficient use of resources to make profit for shareholders-a shift 
in loci of organizational power, normality, and everyday practices.18 
Those categories were also linked in narratives. A central aspect of 
late Soviet and post-Soviet politics involved defending versus changing 
the "sacred" or "profane" location for these categories: for reformers, 
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Soviet-era upravlenie was profane, related to unnatural Soviet socialism. 
Once categories were ordered into sacred or profane, narrative construc-
tion could occur. Reformers could devise a narrative of menedzhment 
applying (Western) rational processes of using labor and capital to raise 
efficiency and profit. This involved creating private property to raise 
investment and to make menedzhery accountable. 
Post-socialism was new meanings, discourses, authority, and prac-
tices that were not crystal clear; they were confused, contentious, and 
retained elements from the past. Meanings do not jump into people's 
minds fully formed; Russians undertook a journey to make sense of 
them in practice. This requires that Russians, and those of us who study 
their economic practices and history, pay closer and more nuanced 
attention to culture: we should pay heed to Viviana Zelizer's (1988) call 
to study "multiple markets." Zelizer's main concern was the American 
economy: that within one economic system exchange took on multiple 
forms, based on different norms, relations, and cultural understand-
ings linked to the different contexts (e.g. from market exchange to 
exchange of gifts). But her idea can be extended to the study of tran-
sitions· as well: that within and between emerging markets there will 
be multiple forms of exchange and production. What this means is 
that Anders Aslund may be right-Russia may have a market econ-
omy, only it will not have much resemblance to Britain's or Poland's 
because of differences in institutional, cultural, and structural trajecto-
ries and processes. While the usual response is to invoke "institutions," 
this is as much smoke and mirrors as a real answer: what are "institu-
tions," anyway, but cultural categories about everyday practice enacted 
collectively, with formal mechanisms of enforcement? This opens the 
door to making more sense of the chaos and conflict of Russian post-
socialism: culture is not universal, shared, straightforward morals or 
values, but contested, not always coherent systems of meaning. Fur-
ther, as scholars such as Anthony Giddens (1984) and others realized 
(e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982), consciousness and knowledge of prac-
tice work at two levels, tacit and conscious. I may change my title 
from direktor (upravlenie logic) to menedzher (menedzhment logic) and 
have no idea how the latter works in practice: labels are an illu-
sion of change. As well, creating menedzher and korporatsiia involves 
remaking status hierarchies-an invitation to conflict and confusion 
(why should a menedzher be legitimate?). Small wonder Russia was 
a mess until oil wealth provided a fig leaf. Given their attention to 
power and culture, economic sociologists should have seen this coming. 
We did not. 
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Culture and economy at work: Moral and market economies 
Categories, structured in sacred-profane dichotomies and ordered in 
narratives, are further ordered as moral and market economies. The 
hierarchy of meanings is as follows: 
categories (sacred-profane) --+ logics/narratives of categories --+ narratives 
of "economies" 
While I discuss moral and market economies in more detail in the next 
chapter, let us set the stage here. A moral economy (cf. Scott 1976) is 
not just norms and practices of redistribution and reciprocity for sur-
vival; it is categories (community, collective property, etc.) embedded in 
narratives (redistribution as necessary for survival, threats of individuals 
acting on their own, etc.). I use "market economy" in an unorthodox 
way: not as social space or institutions of exchange, but as a set of nar-
ratives of how normal exchange is supposed to operate. The narrative 
of markets is a narrative of individual autonomy, prosperity (individual 
and collective), efficiency and competition, and evolutionary progress. 
This all need not be empirically true; narratives are interpretations, and 
like myths they may contain elements of truth, but they are as much 
stories as embodiments of truth. My use of market economy as narrative 
is also not so far from the usual institutional understanding of market 
economy: after all, institutions involve logics and narratives themselves 
that justify those institutions and make them understandable. 
Alas, that narratives have little room in post-socialist analyses reflects 
limitations in existing scholarship on post-socialism. Microeconomics 
and political economy produced insights about barter and trajectories 
of change (e.g. Gaddy and Ickes 2002). However, these theories are lim-
ited by areas of inquiry-for example economic exchange alone, rather 
than exchange and interaction more generally-and by compartmental-
ization within and across disciplines. Economic theory remains locked 
in assumptions of behavior (rational choice), obsolete cognitive mod-
els, and obsession with efficiency explanations (Roy 1997; Herrera 2004: 
chapter 2), such that other social forces such as power and culture are 
ignored, not simply undertheorized; this leads to problematic policy rec-
ommendations or analyses that are plain wrong (Millar 1995). Much of 
this is inexcusable when a well-developed, sophisticated literature on 
culture (often including criticisms of economic theory that economists 
have avoided) has existed for decades.19 Political science and economic 
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sociology have fared better, but there remains room for improvement. 
General variables are elite politics, state structure and capacity (or, more 
likely, state incapacity), regional social capital or networks, and formal 
law and policies (Stoner-Weiss 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Hendley, 
Murrell, and Ryterman 1999; Eyal et al 2001). Social relations are not 
unimportant, but to conceptualize them as structure alone, rather than 
addressing their meanings-and changes in meanings-is an enormous 
oversight (cf. Humphrey 2002). 
While existing scholarship provides a cornucopia of data and con-
cepts, richness remains circumscribed because interesting theoretical 
approaches that could deliver powerful insights are pigeonholed into 
specific areas of study due to academic compartmentalization. For 
example, Pierre Bourdieu's work on class inequality and reproduction 
provides an interesting foundation for new thinking about the nature 
of post-Soviet institution-building, especially the importance of fields 
of struggle and power and their rules of engagement. While Stark and 
Bruszt (1998) discuss post-socialist fields, their use of the concept makes 
it feel tacked on rather than elucidated and applied innovatively. We are 
in a position to take Bourdieu's ideas of field and doxa, habitus, and capi-
tal and expand them in a context of radical change. Work on professions 
accentuating the complex nature of authority (Starr 1982) can provide 
insights into relations between different social groups, such as manages 
and employees or managers and owners, in the post-privatization era. 
Advancements in the understanding of power (Lukes 1974; Foucault 
1977; Scott 1990) have not been so well utilized in social science, and 
for post-Soviet transformations they may provide powerful insights into 
why we see existing trajectories and variations. 
Thus, one goal of this book is to challenge and expand our under-
standings of post-Soviet transformations by tapping theories so far 
underutilized (if used at all) in analyses. I will draw on various sources 
of data-original primary-source data as well secondary data from vari-
ous disciplines and accounts-to map out a theoretical landscape. One 
important goal is to rethink how to look at these data. Thus far post-
Soviet institutional change has been a story of legislation by parliaments 
and presidents or struggles between elites for control of polity and econ-
omy. Following seminal insights from Pierre Bourdieu, I want to look 
deeper into social dynamics of institutional change. Institutions as sets 
of collective rules and practices-often assumed to be formalized rules 
and procedures but possibly informal, reenacted through everyday prac-
tices and informal sanctions (cf. North 1990)-are embedded in fields 
of social interaction structured by statuses, classificatory schemas, and 
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assumes rules of the game (doxa). Thus, I suggest that rebuilding post-
Soviet economies (and polities and societies) involved not only policies 
and laws but also remaking broader assumptions and classifications of 
the "post-Soviet" game-what the game is. State actors played key roles, 
but they were far from alone and could not escape fields. States engage 
fields through material resources (i.e. financing some actors over oth-
ers) and coercion (enforcing laws). This dimension to state power is 
well known. Yet this is only part of the picture. Following Bourdieu 
(1996), I suggest that states also accumulate and wield (or lose) symbolic 
resources, especially status of legitimate authority and the capacity to confer 
social legitimacy. This dimension of the state is usually lost in accounts 
of post-Soviet change (but see Humphrey 2002). When states grant or 
enforce rights, they are not simply throwing the weight of material 
resources force behind social claimants; they are signaling social legit-
imacy, including the status of social actors to make legitimate claims 
and rely on the state to enforce them-as if the state is conferring some 
of its social status and authority to these private actors. 
To draw out these themes, in Chapter 1 I work out the symbolic 
dimension of economic fields and moral and market economies as 
structured normative frames in fields. The sources of authority and 
sovereignty become issues of contention, and I will suggest that post-
Soviet Russia has gone through three phases or "acts" (in the theatrical 
sense) of authority, and that this helps us make sense of the various 
forms of struggle and conflict that emerged. Chapter 2 examines cultural 
foundations of enterprises and enterprise restructuring, in particular 
how moral and market economies coexisted and then contradicted one 
another, as managers and workers negotiated remaking the structure 
and meaning of the late Soviet and early post-Soviet firm. Chapter 3 
examines how actors restructured the foundations of exchange, espe-
cially structuring and defending obligations such as contract. Given the 
weakness of the state and problematic laws related to exchange, moral 
economy provided a normative dimension of defense that Durkheim 
once called the non-contractual dimension of contract. Chapter 4 turns 
to the manifestation of value. The ruble was not the only means for 
storing value and facilitating exchange; the multiplicity of "currencies" 
was a response to uncertainty and state incapacity to enforce the ruble 
as uniform currency in local fields. Private actors devised alternative 
"currencies" to avoid state regulation and taxation in games of resis-
tance and survival. Chapter 5 examines the moral economy of the 
state, property, and fields of power: how state elites and officials were 
embedded in moral economy norms, and change and continuity in 
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those norms; and how state actors contributed to the development of 
market and moral economies through legislation and participation in 
discourse. 
This book is not a study of one firm or set of firms/sectors to control 
specific variables. My goal is to elucidate particular cultural processes too 
often elided. For such model building, a more general empirical inves-
tigation is justifiable.20 While focused studies facilitate rigorous data 
collection and analysis, especially the capacity to control for different 
variables under scrutiny, they are also limited in making sense of the 
post-socialist experience because they are so focused on narrow issues 
and data sources. My goal is to take a broader look, and this requires a 
broader set of empirical issues and cases, and a wider net for capturing 
data. I use both primary and secondary data sources here. To the extent 
there is a case, it is the political economy of Russia; specific cases most 
often come from St. Petersburg, because I did extensive research in that 
city owing to networks allowing data access, familiarity with the city, its 
size and variation in types of economic activity. When possible, I will 
draw on work done by others so as not to reinvent the wheel. In other 
cases I will draw on data I collected: interviews and fieldwork from the 
1990s, enterprise newspapers from the late Soviet and early post-Soviet 
periods. The analysis is qualitative and interpretive, in the tradition of 
historical and cultural sociology and much political and economic soci-
ology. In the process of rethinking the post-Soviet experience, I engage 
some previous scholarship, but I will be judicious in doing so. Litera-
ture reviews have their place, but the massive amount of scholarship 
on post-socialism would risk a literature review devouring this work, 
and engaging too much risks distracting attention from the argument 
at hand. Further, not all work on post-socialism is sufficiently useful or 
relevant. I also admit a bias: my experience at job talks, conferences, and 
other presentations convinced me that many engagements of scholarly 
literature are exercises in posturing or creating "enemies" to signal one's 
position or to add a halo of legitimacy to one's work. I invite the reader 
to be the ultimate arbiter.21 
